Greg Detre
@4.30 on Thursday, 22 June, 2000
Emotion + Consciousness seminars
dennett distinction � personal + subpersonal
e.g. cannot demand further explanation of behavioural control in terms of �mental processes�
explanation of pain = non-mechanistic
explanations of actions in terms of desires are not causal explanations in the Humean sense of the term
personal
experiencing, thinking subjects + agents
ignore phys mechs � different level of description
Intentional (representational, about things)
these descriptions have the logical property of intensionality � the way in which the things are described, as opposed to the extensional target
sub-personal
brains + events in the nervous system
can�t take �pain� to this level
occurrences, describable in purely mech terms
unidentifiable with the sensations + actions of persons
scientific + extensional
yes: extensional description of system of internal states or events can be upgraded to Intentional description
further interpretation
hornsby (2000) � why be so strict about separating sub/personal if the gap can be bridged?
the worry is that information-proc psych takes personal-level notions (e.g. representation + rule) and moves them to a sub-pers level of description
subsystems performing tasks like homunculi, hence the talk about representations + rules
but the talk of homunculi is mere metaphor
can tell the whole story literally, without intrusion of personal level notions
alternative conception (that information-proc psych is not in the business of mere metaphor)
three levels, none of which are merely �as if�
the personal level
level of information-proc
biological level
Davies = a reductionist, but not an ultra-reductionist or a non-reductionist
but there still remain upward explanatory gaps
what it is like to be that organism
subjective experience depends on perceptual apparatus vs our grasp of sci theories independent of our perceptual apparatus
the functional role of the perception of the colour red tells you nothing about the subjective quality � lacking the conceptual apparatus to see how they hang together
why is (a grasp of the neural basis of) consciousness so difficult to explain?
not from introspection
not from observation
not from inference to the best explanation
\ consciousness has a neural basis, but we cannot grasp it
look from the neural side: observable properties, inference to the best explanation
look from the consciousness:
observable properties, inference to the best explanation
starting from the properties of consciousness presented to introspction, will inference introduce an intelligble neural basis for consciousness?
it will if there is, and won�t if there isn�t � stalemate, leaves it open (see Flanagan, Carruthers)
2 notions of consciousness independent of each other:
phenomenal consciousness = experience, phenomenal, types
access consciousness = poised for direct control of thought + action, representational, functional, tokens (representations: free use in reasoning, direct �rational� control of action + speech)
why is there no A without P in the real world?
information-proc theoreis of P-consciousness leave the explanatory gap
both P- and A-consciousness are personal-level notions
P-consciousness may figure in the causal explanation of A-consciousness
a mental state is conscious if it has a roughtly contemporanous thought of being a mental state (???)
offers relief from mystery
but:
is the notion of thought a demanding one?
either excludes animals or includes systems that detect their own representational states
(Maher) delusions = false beliefs that arise as rational responses to unusually experiences
anomalous experience + normal reasoning = delusional belief
Capgras delusion � that closest relatives have been replaced by imposters
Ellis, Young: arises from a deficit in face processing (opp of prospagnosia, intact face recognition but without the affect response that you would expect)
upward explanatory gap � arises only in phenomenal consciousness or in other areas?
reasons, plans etc. also explanatory gaps? MD yes, Rolls no
purpose of philosophers
they can offer an arg
they can follow up intuitions and reason them out, i.e. arguments depend on first having premises
they make distinctions
Block: P- and A- consciousness
what�s the demand for something being a satisfying explanation of consciousness?
maybe good idea to worry more about the philosophy of explanation than the philosophy of consciousness
at some stage, you just have to say, �shut up! that�s [brute fact] just the way things are�
narrow the explanatory gap by just saying that it must be like something to be a machine with a representation of itself grounded in the real world?
if you do have that machine, you are closer to consciousness, then you�re imposing your own conception of plans onto it
galen: rethink your notion of matter � just don�t know enough about matter to say why it�s positively mysterious for it to be conscious
�shut up greg! that�s just the way things are�
dennett vs davidson � supervenience vs levels
mcginn: why is �inference to the best explanation� a definite no-no for explaining consciousness?
is Rolls� big idea that he inverts the chain of reason involving A- and P-consciousness?
can we thread a path between the 2 paths of the HOT dilemma?
dispositional vs occurrent HOT
mcginn rests on the cognitive closure answer by a process of elimination
diaphenousness